Eskom's Self-Healing Grid: How a Decade of Crisis Forced South Africa to Build the Substation of the Future

Abstract

For most of the 2010s, South Africa's grid wasn't failing — it was collapsing slowly, under the weight of aging plant, chronic under-investment, and management dysfunction at Eskom. Over 7,000 hours of load shedding between 2019 and 2024 turned the national utility into a byword for system failure. The response, when it came, was not a gradual modernisation plan but a forced transformation: a five-year R321.7 billion capital programme, 200 AI pilots, and a declared ambition to build a self-healing grid. This paper argues that Eskom's current trajectory is best understood not as technological enthusiasm, but as a pragmatic response to an infrastructure emergency — and that the engineering choices being made now will define South Africa's grid for the next thirty years.

Introduction: A Grid Built for Crisis

On the worst days of South Africa's load shedding era, hospitals ran on generators. Factories shut production lines. Traffic lights went dark for eight hours at a time. Between 2019 and 2024, Eskom implemented more than 7,000 hours of scheduled outages — loadshedding, in the local lexicon — an economic cost estimated by the South African Reserve Bank at over R338 billion (approximately USD 18.3 billion at April 2025 rates).

Currency note: All ZAR/USD conversions in this article use an approximate rate of 18.5 ZAR/USD (South African Reserve Bank average, April 2025). Large rand figures are converted at first mention only.

The crisis had structural roots. Eskom operates more than 80% of South Africa's generation capacity and serves over 6.4 million direct customers. Its fleet — dominated by aging coal plants built in the 1970s and 1980s — had been maintained poorly for over a decade. The Energy Availability Factor (EAF), which measures what fraction of nameplate capacity is actually available to generate, fell below 55% at its nadir in 2022–23. A healthy utility runs at 80–85%.

Figure 1 — Eskom Crisis and Recovery: Loadshedding Hours and Energy Availability Factor (2019–2025)

{
  "title": {
    "text": "Eskom: Crisis and Recovery (2019–2025)",
    "subtext": "Loadshedding hours: ESKOMSePush / CSIR estimates. EAF: Eskom annual reports / NTCSA weekly reports.",
    "left": "center",
    "textStyle": { "fontSize": 16 }
  },
  "tooltip": {
    "trigger": "axis",
    "axisPointer": { "type": "cross" }
  },
  "legend": {
    "data": ["Loadshedding (hours/year)", "Energy Availability Factor (EAF %)"],
    "bottom": 0
  },
  "grid": { "left": "8%", "right": "10%", "bottom": "14%", "containLabel": true },
  "xAxis": {
    "type": "category",
    "data": ["2019", "2020", "2021", "2022", "2023", "2024", "2025"],
    "axisLabel": { "fontSize": 12 }
  },
  "yAxis": [
    {
      "type": "value",
      "name": "Hours/year",
      "min": 0,
      "max": 8000,
      "position": "left",
      "axisLabel": { "formatter": "{value}" },
      "axisLine": { "lineStyle": { "color": "#DC2626" } }
    },
    {
      "type": "value",
      "name": "EAF %",
      "min": 45,
      "max": 75,
      "position": "right",
      "axisLabel": { "formatter": "{value}%" },
      "axisLine": { "lineStyle": { "color": "#2563EB" } }
    }
  ],
  "series": [
    {
      "name": "Loadshedding (hours/year)",
      "type": "bar",
      "yAxisIndex": 0,
      "data": [523, 859, 1158, 3776, 6945, 1757, 26],
      "itemStyle": { "color": "#DC2626", "opacity": 0.8 },
      "barMaxWidth": 50
    },
    {
      "name": "Energy Availability Factor (EAF %)",
      "type": "line",
      "yAxisIndex": 1,
      "data": [67.8, 64.5, 58.5, 58.1, 54.8, 59.9, 65.2],
      "itemStyle": { "color": "#2563EB" },
      "lineStyle": { "width": 2.5 },
      "symbol": "circle",
      "symbolSize": 8,
      "label": {
        "show": true,
        "position": "top",
        "formatter": "{c}%",
        "fontSize": 11
      }
    }
  ]
}

Note: Loadshedding hours are calendar-year estimates derived from ESKOMSePush historical data and CSIR Utility Statistics Reports. EAF values are approximate annual averages from Eskom annual reports and NTCSA weekly system status reports. 2025 reflects the near-total cessation of loadshedding: only 26 hours were implemented in April–May 2025, with 300+ consecutive loadshedding-free days achieved by March 2026.

But crises, if they are survived, create conditions for transformation that comfortable systems never achieve. The combination of acute financial pressure, regulatory intervention, and visible public failure that Eskom endured between 2015 and 2024 forced a clarity of purpose that incremental planning cannot produce. By 2025, the utility had stabilised: EAF climbed to 65.24%, and Eskom reported its first net profit in eight years in FY2025. With the generation crisis receding, the question shifted from how do we keep the lights on tonight to how do we build a grid that can keep them on by itself.

The answer, articulated in March 2026 at the Huawei Industrial Digital and Intelligent Transformation Summit in Barcelona, is the self-healing grid: a network capable of detecting faults, isolating them, and restoring supply with minimal human intervention.

This is the story of how a decade of failure made that ambition inevitable.

1. The Scale of the Problem: What the Numbers Say

Before examining the technology, it is worth establishing the context in which it must operate.

South Africa's electricity trajectory has been shaped by two forces pulling in opposite directions: sluggish economic growth depressing demand, and electrification goals and re-industrialisation pushing it up. South Africa generated 231,066 GWh (231 TWh) of electricity in 2025, according to Statistics South Africa — a recovery from the load shedding lows that artificially suppressed demand through supply rationing.

The International Energy Agency (IEA), which formally welcomed South Africa into its membership in 2024, projects that African electricity demand will grow at approximately 3–5% per year through 2030, driven by electrification, population growth, and early-stage industrialisation. For South Africa specifically, the IEA's moderate growth scenario implies demand reaching approximately 265–270 TWh by 2030 — requiring both generation capacity and, critically, a distribution network capable of handling the load reliably.

Figure 2 — South Africa Electricity Demand: Historical and IEA Moderate Scenario (TWh)

{
  "title": {
    "text": "South Africa: Electricity Demand 2020–2030",
    "subtext": "Historical: Stats SA / CSIR. Projection: IEA Africa moderate growth scenario (~3% p.a.)",
    "left": "center",
    "textStyle": { "fontSize": 16 }
  },
  "tooltip": {
    "trigger": "axis",
    "formatter": "{b}: {c} TWh"
  },
  "legend": {
    "data": ["Historical", "IEA Projection"],
    "bottom": 0
  },
  "grid": { "left": "8%", "right": "5%", "bottom": "12%", "containLabel": true },
  "xAxis": {
    "type": "category",
    "data": ["2020", "2021", "2022", "2023", "2024", "2025", "2026", "2027", "2028", "2029", "2030"],
    "axisLabel": { "fontSize": 12 }
  },
  "yAxis": {
    "type": "value",
    "name": "TWh",
    "min": 190,
    "max": 290,
    "axisLabel": { "formatter": "{value}" }
  },
  "series": [
    {
      "name": "Historical",
      "type": "line",
      "data": [213, 220, 218, 220, 226, 231, null, null, null, null, null],
      "itemStyle": { "color": "#2563EB" },
      "lineStyle": { "width": 2.5 },
      "symbol": "circle",
      "symbolSize": 7
    },
    {
      "name": "IEA Projection",
      "type": "line",
      "data": [null, null, null, null, null, 231, 238, 245, 253, 260, 268],
      "itemStyle": { "color": "#F59E0B" },
      "lineStyle": { "width": 2.5, "type": "dashed" },
      "symbol": "circle",
      "symbolSize": 7
    }
  ]
}

Sources: Statistics South Africa (2025 confirmed generation); CSIR Utility Statistics Report 2024/25; IEA Africa Energy Outlook 2022; IEA Electricity 2025. Historical figures approximate; 2025 anchor confirmed.

The grid serving this demand is under-capitalised. The IEA's Africa Energy Outlook 2022 estimated that achieving universal electricity access across Africa by 2030 would require USD 22–30 billion per year in grid investment — primarily in transmission and distribution infrastructure. South Africa is not starting from zero, but it is catching up decades of deferred maintenance and expansion simultaneously.

Domestically, the cost of that deferred investment has been felt in consumer bills: electricity prices in South Africa have risen by over 42% since 2020, according to Enerdata, even as reliability declined. Customers are now paying more for power that is less dependably available — a political and commercial pressure that has accelerated the shift from passive infrastructure management to active, intelligent grid control.

2. Technology in Practice: The Architecture of a Self-Healing Grid

2.1 Standardisation as Foundation: The IEC 61850 Story

The self-healing grid cannot be improvised. It requires a coherent technical architecture, consistently applied across thousands of substations. This is where Eskom's thirty years of protection, automation and control (PAC) standardisation becomes relevant — and often overlooked.

Stuart van Zyl, a protection engineer from Eskom Transmission, has documented a standardisation philosophy that predates the current modernisation wave by decades. In a 2021 technical paper, van Zyl described how Eskom standardised its PAC schemes at bay level — protection, metering, and control — across transmission and distribution since the early 1990s. Contracts with engineering suppliers were established over four- to five-year terms, with prototyping and design freeze before production rollout.

The inflection point came with IEC 61850. Van Zyl documented that changes introduced since 2015 were driven by "the widespread adoption of IEC 61850" — a shift from proprietary point-to-point wiring to a digital communications architecture that enables interoperability between devices from different manufacturers. The implications are significant:

• GOOSE messaging (Generic Object Oriented Substation Events) is a core IEC 61850 protocol that enables protection IEDs to exchange status and trip commands peer-to-peer in under 10 milliseconds — a capability that underpins fast protection and, in architectures designed for it, automated fault isolation
• Standardised engineering: SCL (Substation Configuration Language) files replace CAD drawings, enabling configuration management at scale
• Vendor flexibility: frame contracts with multiple suppliers become possible without bespoke engineering for each site

Eskom has formalised its digital substation architecture in an internal standard — substation automation network architecture document ST_240-98186227 Rev 1 — referenced publicly through the Eskom Tender Bulletin. This document is not freely downloadable; it is an engineering specification used in procurement. Engineers seeking to review it may submit a request through Eskom's official procurement portal or contact Eskom Engineering directly. The tender bulletin reference confirms its existence as a formal standards document, but independent verification of its content requires direct engagement with Eskom.

The significance: a self-healing capability built on IEC 61850 is not a pilot project at one substation. The standard creates a scalable architecture that can propagate across the network as standards-compliant equipment replaces aging plant. That is what makes Eskom's current programme more than a one-off modernisation: it is a platform change.

2.2 FLISR: The Operational Core

Fault Location, Isolation and Service Restoration (FLISR) is the technology that converts the architecture into customer-facing reliability improvement.

On a conventional MV feeder, a fault triggers a protection trip. A field crew is dispatched, the fault is located, the faulted section is manually isolated, and supply is restored to un-faulted sections. This process takes hours. Customers on the un-faulted sections — who have nothing to do with the fault — lose supply while the field crew works.

FLISR automates the sequence. The following describes how FLISR operates in an IEC 61850-enabled network — the architecture Eskom has standardised — based on published IEEE research and engineering practice. Eskom has not published a detailed account of its specific FLISR implementation or the communication protocols used in production.

In a FLISR-enabled feeder:

1. Fault detection triggers the upstream circuit breaker to open
2. The FLISR controller — communicating via SCADA polling or, in more tightly integrated architectures, via IEC 61850 peer-to-peer messaging — identifies the faulted section within seconds
3. Sectionalising switches isolate the fault
4. The un-faulted sections are re-energised via alternate feed paths — often within 30–90 seconds in deployments documented in international literature

The customer experience changes fundamentally. Instead of a multi-hour outage, most customers on the feeder experience a momentary interruption. The fault still exists and requires repair — but repair can now be scheduled on a planned basis, without a live outage affecting hundreds of customers.

What Eskom has publicly confirmed regarding FLISR: - Active engineering research on FLISR applied to Eskom's ring-topology MV networks is documented in IEEE conference papers (2018 and 2023), confirming that FLISR challenges specific to Eskom's network topology are under active study - Eskom has standardised on IEC 61850 — the architecture that enables automated fault isolation at the device level - Eskom has publicly declared an ambition for a self-healing distribution network (Barcelona, March 2026)

What the public record does not confirm: - The specific communication protocol (GOOSE, SCADA polling, or other) used in Eskom's FLISR implementations - The number of feeders or substations where FLISR is operationally deployed - Measured restoration times from Eskom's production network

Quantified impact on Eskom-topology networks: academic modelling of South African MV feeders (independent research, not Eskom-attributed) found SAIDI improvements of 47.2% and SAIFI improvements of 35.8% from smart grid automation including FLISR. An earlier study found 30% SAIDI improvement from automated feeder switching alone. These figures are modelling-based estimates, not measured operational results from Eskom's network.

The technical standardisation work — IEC 61850 architecture, ADMS procurement, OMS integration — represents the prerequisite foundation for FLISR at scale. The engineering argument is that a utility with a mature IEC 61850 substrate can deploy FLISR efficiently; whether and how extensively Eskom has done so remains undocumented in public sources.

2.3 The Capital Programme: R321.7 Billion Over Five Years

The technical architecture is funded by Eskom's board-approved five-year capital plan (FY2026–FY2030): R321.72 billion (approximately USD 17.4 billion) — a 52% increase over the preceding five-year envelope.

More than R100 billion (approximately USD 5.4 billion) is specifically earmarked for transmission and distribution — the network that the self-healing architecture must run on. The NTCSA capex allocation alone ramps from R9.96 billion (~USD 538 million) in FY2025 to R38.72 billion (~USD 2.1 billion) in FY2030, reflecting the priority placed on transmission build-out as new generation capacity — predominantly renewables — connects to the grid.

Within distribution, the programme includes:

Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI): ~7 million smart meters by 2029. The AMI layer provides outage detection at customer level without field dispatch — the data foundation for ADMS-driven fault management.

Battery Energy Storage (BESS): 800 MWh in Phase 1, with active construction at three Western Cape sites (Skaapvlei, Graafwater, Paleisheuwel). A separate 600 MWh Komati project is underway in Mpumalanga. All Phase 1 battery equipment has been delivered; commissioning expected FY2026.

Microgrids: 250 units targeted over the five-year period, with priority for hospitals, clinics and schools in remote communities. The Ficksburg demonstration project in Free State province — solar PV, diesel backup, storage, smart metering, autonomous island-mode control — is the template.

D-VAR technology: Pilot deployments on MV feeders to manage voltage excursions caused by variable solar and wind, reducing protection trip events that would otherwise generate FLISR calls.

2.4 The AI Layer: 200 Pilots

Len de Villiers, Eskom's Chief IT Officer, speaking in Barcelona in March 2026:

"We are going to make sure that AI is not inhibited but is carefully directed. I am at the moment sitting with 200 AI pilots in our company."

Among the pilots: a predictive fault management system for the distribution network. If successful, it shifts the maintenance paradigm from corrective (fix after failure) and preventive (fixed schedule) to predictive (intervene before failure). Combined with FLISR's automated restoration, predictive maintenance closes the loop: fewer faults occur, and those that do are resolved faster.

The Huawei intelligent substation project — acknowledged as "underdelivering" as of March 2026 — is the specific point of integration between the AI/data layer and the physical substation infrastructure.

3. The Forward View: 2026–2030

What IEA Data Says About the Stakes

The IEA's projection of South Africa's electricity demand reaching 265–270 TWh by 2030 (moderate scenario) implies a significant challenge for grid infrastructure. That growth — roughly 15–17% over five years from the 2025 base — must be absorbed by a network that is simultaneously being retrofitted from legacy plant to digital architecture.

The IEA's Africa Energy Outlook 2022 frames the investment dimension: Africa requires USD 22–30 billion per year in electricity infrastructure investment to meet universal access targets and growth demand. South Africa is in a different position from sub-Saharan peers — it has largely built out grid reach (Eskom's coverage leaves only ~3% of households off-grid) — but the quality, reliability and capacity of the existing network requires comparable investment intensity.

The IEA World Energy Investment 2024 notes that Africa faces "significant debt repayments" that make financing for clean energy projects scarce, with concessional support increasingly essential. Eskom's plan to return to capital markets in 2028 — the first time since before the debt crisis — is the critical enabler. If the R321.7 billion capex plan requires Eskom to borrow, the utility's creditworthiness in 2028 will determine the pace of distribution modernisation in the 2028–2035 period.

The Regulatory Dimension

Two regulatory developments will shape the grid architecture:

NTCSA separation: The National Transmission Company South Africa — being separated from Eskom under the Electricity Regulation Amendment Act — will own and operate the transmission network as an independent entity. The capex ramp from R9.96 billion to R38.72 billion reflects the urgency of building transmission to unlock renewable energy connections. A transmission-constrained grid cannot support distributed self-healing: the HV backbone must be robust before MV automation has somewhere reliable to restore supply to.

DSO framework: Eskom's Chief Engineer Shamir Newalani presented Eskom's position on the Distribution System Operator framework at the CIGRE Southern Africa Regional Conference in October 2025. The DSO transition requires ADMS, DERMS and OMS as the operational software stack. These are not aspirational technologies — they are the management systems without which a self-healing distribution network cannot be operated safely at scale.

What Engineers Should Watch

Four specific milestones in the 2026–2028 window will indicate whether the self-healing programme is on track:

1. AMI rollout progress: Any announcement of smart meters deployed beyond the current pilot scale indicates the data layer is being established
2. BESS commissioning: The Western Cape sites entering service confirms energy storage is physically integrated with grid operations
3. ADMS procurement: Announcement of an ADMS contract signals that the operational software layer is being acquired
4. Capital markets: Any 2027–28 bond issuance by Eskom under investment-grade or near-investment-grade conditions will confirm the financing runway for Phase 2 of the programme

4. What the World Can Learn from Eskom — and What Eskom Still Needs to Learn

The Case for the Defence

It is tempting to dismiss Eskom's self-healing ambitions as aspirational. The honest assessment is that self-healing is the destination, not the current state. The Huawei substation is underdelivering. The FLISR deployment count is unknown. The ADMS is not yet procured.

But the strategic trajectory is more credible than it appears from a distance. Consider what Eskom has actually achieved:

• Thirty years of PAC standardisation — the unglamorous prerequisite that makes scaling possible. Most utilities attempting digitalisation do so from a base of heterogeneous equipment with no common engineering philosophy. Eskom is not.
• IEC 61850 adoption since 2015 — not a pilot, but a systematic revision of engineering standards across the wires business (transmission and distribution)
• A proven microgrid template (Ficksburg) that can be replicated for the remaining 3% of off-grid communities
• A published capex commitment with segmental breakdowns, tied to a stated goal of capital market access — meaning the numbers are accountable

The key insight for the global engineering community: the crisis was the accelerant. Eskom did not choose to modernise from a position of comfort. It was forced to by financial collapse, regulatory pressure, and the very visible failure of the old model. The result is a commitment to IEC 61850-based architecture and AI-driven operations that many more comfortable utilities have not yet made.

What Public Evidence Still Does Not Show

Transparency requires acknowledging the gaps. The items below are not documented failures — they are areas where public data is insufficient to assess deployment status or operational performance:

The publication gap is the real issue. South Africa's energy engineering community is active and internationally engaged — the engineering talent and institutional knowledge exist. What is missing is systematic public reporting of operational KPIs that would allow independent assessment of progress.

Utilities in Western Europe and North America that have deployed FLISR at scale publish SAIDI/SAIFI reports annually, often with automated system attribution. Eskom's annual reports contain qualitative statements about distribution performance being "within target" and "resilient." The gap between the technology's potential and the documented evidence of its deployment is the single most significant unresolved question in this analysis.

The Lesson

For utilities facing similar modernisation challenges — and there are many — the Eskom case offers three propositions:

First: Standardisation is not exciting, but it is foundational. A utility that has spent thirty years enforcing consistent bay-level engineering philosophy can scale IEC 61850 adoption systematically. A utility that has allowed heterogeneous procurement will spend those same years migrating legacy systems before automation can begin.

Second: The IEC 61850 architecture is the enabler, not the end state. FLISR automation, ADMS integration, and DERMS for distributed resources are the applications. The standard creates the conditions for these applications to be deployed without bespoke integration engineering at every substation.

Third: Forced transformation produces outcomes that voluntary modernisation postpones indefinitely. This is not an argument for allowing systems to fail. It is an observation that regulatory pressure, financial accountability, and visible public consequences — the combination that drove Eskom's programme — create the conditions for decisive action that planning processes alone do not.

Whether Eskom completes the transition before the next crisis is the open question. The architecture, the capital, and the engineering intent are in place. Execution — at scale, on time, against a debt-constrained balance sheet — is what remains to be demonstrated.

Sources

1. Business Day — Eskom bets on AI to build self-healing grid and boost energy security, 3 March 2026. https://www.businessday.co.za/news/2026-03-03-eskom-bets-on-ai-to-build-self-healing-grid-and-boost-energy-security/
2. Joburg ETC — 200 AI Pilots, Data Scientists, and a 'Self-Healing' Grid, March 2026. https://www.joburgetc.com/news/eskom-ai-self-healing-grid-energy-security/
3. TechCentral — Eskom's high-tech push to modernise the grid, 2025. https://techcentral.co.za/eskoms-high-tech-push-to-modernise-the-grid/272811/
4. Energize — Eskom outlines vision for digitally integrated distribution networks, October 2025. https://www.energize.co.za/article/eskom-outlines-vision-for-digitally-integrated-distribution-networks
5. Engineering News — Eskom outlines R320bn capex plan, as it signals 2028 return to capital markets, October 2025. https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/eskom-outlines-r320bn-capex-plan-as-it-signals-2028-return-to-capital-markets-2025-10-01
6. Polity.org.za — Eskom's R321bn capex plan has strong focus on grid, renewables and gas, April 2025. https://www.polity.org.za/article/eskoms-r321bn-capex-plan-has-strong-focus-on-grid-renewables-and-gas-2025-04-25
7. ITWeb — Microgrid tech powers Free State community. https://www.itweb.co.za/article/microgrid-tech-powers-free-state-community/Wdgp45qaKZ7X9l8E
8. Stuart van Zyl, Eskom Transmission — Standardization of PAC schemes in Eskom, South Africa, 2021. Van Zyl documents Eskom's standardisation philosophy and the shift to IEC 61850 since 2015.
9. Statistics South Africa — Electricity generation in South Africa, 2025: 231,066 GWh. https://www.statssa.gov.za/
10. IEA — Africa Energy Outlook 2022 — Grid investment requirements: USD 22–30 billion/year for universal access by 2030. https://www.iea.org/reports/africa-energy-outlook-2022
11. IEA — Electricity 2025 — Africa electricity demand growth: ~5% annually through 2027. https://www.iea.org/reports/electricity-2025
12. IEA — World Energy Investment 2024 — Africa: financing constraints and concessional finance need. https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2024/africa
13. Enerdata — South Africa Energy Information — Electricity prices up 42% since 2020; IRP2025 targets; JET IP ZAR 1.48 trillion. https://www.enerdata.net/estore/energy-market/south-africa/
14. IEEE AUPEC 2018 — Investigation into the Issues Associated with Closing an Automated Normally Open (NO) Point on Medium Voltage Networks Where FLISR Tool Is Planned. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8521157
15. ResearchGate 2023 — Improving Service Restoration on the Eskom Distribution Grid System through Network Reconfiguration. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/373083437_Improving_Service_Restoration_on_the_Eskom_Distribution_Grid_System_through_Network_Reconfiguration
16. ResearchGate 2014 — FLISR technique using IEC 61850 GOOSE. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261505695_Fault_location_isolation_and_service_restoration_FLISR_technique_using_IEC_61850_GOOSE
17. Scielo / JESA 2015 — Reliability benefit of smart grid technologies: A case for South Africa. http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1021-447X2015000300001
18. Academia.edu — Evaluation of Smart Technology for the Improvement of Reliability in a Power Distribution System. https://www.academia.edu/27293213/
19. Eskom — Integrated Results FY2025. https://www.eskom.co.za/investors/integrated-results/
20. Eskom Tender Bulletin — Substation Automation Network Architecture Standard (ST_240-98186227 Rev 1). https://tenderbulletin.eskom.co.za/webapi/api/Files/GetFile?FileID=414519
21. Eskom — 300 days without loadshedding, March 2026. https://www.eskom.co.za/eskom-marks-300-days-without-loadshedding-as-sustained-generation-performance-maintains-grid-stability-and-energy-security/
22. CSIR — Utility-Scale Power Generation Statistics in South Africa, January 2025. https://www.csir.co.za/

— Sergey Shubkin ✍️ | Editor, digitalsubstation.com