Digital Substation

Relay protection, SCADA, Metering, and Cybersecurity for electrical infrastructure.

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IEC 61850 reports: where telemetry transfer most often breaks on a digital substation

In digital-substation projects most attention goes to GOOSE, SV, PTP and the network. But there is another important layer — MMS exchange and IEC 61850 reports, through which SCADA, HMI, gateways and monitoring systems receive telemetry from IEDs. In practice the problems here are deceptively simple: the MMS connection is up, the device is reachable, the client «sees» the server — yet data does not update, some signals disappear, events are duplicated, or the report control block does not activate at all. This article covers the sharpest problems with report control blocks (RptEna, ConfRev, a block already taken by another client, TrgOps, a DataSet mismatch, duplication from the buffer via entryID and too much faith in the SCL file) and a practical principle: cross-check the SCL file, the device's actual MMS model and a PCAP capture together.

Turning a pcap into a technical report in one click: automated analysis of a digital substation's GOOSE traffic

On a digital substation, the end devices kept reporting a communication fault that just as suddenly cleared itself, and the cause stayed unclear — the alarm was a shared one. The only source of information was a pcap file about 11 minutes long — almost 186,000 GOOSE packets and more than 200 sources. A manual analysis in Wireshark at that scale would have taken hours. We show how, in a few minutes, the Tekvel Magic software turned the network capture into a structured Excel report of an unscheduled inspection.

What ePRTC and TDG are: why a digital substation needs a new precise-time architecture

Precise time is a mandatory part of a modern substation: it is needed for event recording and oscillography, for Sampled Values, for phasor measurements and for other applications. But relying on a local receiver alone is becoming increasingly dangerous: jamming, interference and spoofing turn a single satellite source into a systemic risk. An architecture built around an ePRTC (enhanced Primary Reference Time Clock) in the telecom network and a TDG (Time Distribution Gateway) on site offers a heterogeneous approach: one precise time comes «from the sky», another «via the ground». The article — what ePRTC and TDG are, how they fit IEC 61850-9-3 PTP, and why a single redundant GNSS receiver is not enough.

IEC 61850 conformance certificates: where to look for them and what a certificate really confirms

"Shall support IEC 61850" is too general a wording. We look at where to check IEC 61850 conformance certificates today, what a conformance certificate really confirms, how a registry of 1,650 test records is structured by editions and roles, the seven parameters to check in a certificate, and how conformance testing differs from interoperability testing — and how to phrase a requirement in a specification instead of a vague phrase about "standard support".

MAC addresses, OUI and the digital substation: how to know who is on the technology network

In a pcap from a digital substation attention usually goes to GOOSE, SV, MMS and PTP. But useful diagnostics often live lower — in the MAC addresses. The article explains what an OUI is and how MA-L, MA-M, MA-S and CID differ, how to guess a vendor from the first octets, why a shared Source MAC on two IEDs breaks MMS and triggers MAC flapping, and what a digital-substation engineer should check on a first pass over a pcap.

vIED, the CIGRE Way: What WG B5.84 Says You Can — and Cannot — Virtualise

CIGRE's first dedicated framework for virtualised IEDs will not publish until Q1 2028 — but the vPAC pilots that have to align to it are being commissioned now. Its scope is already public, through the working group's Terms of Reference and a framework article refeatured in ELECTRA 345 (April 2026): what is mandatory, what is deliberately out of scope, and what every 2026 vPAC pilot should already be doing in response.

Cuba's National Grid Collapses Again: A Technical Analysis

On March 16, 2026, Cuba experienced its eighth major blackout in 25 months — and its second total grid collapse of March alone. The Ministry reported that no faults were detected in operating units at the time of collapse, pointing to a structural cascading failure driven by chronic generation deficit.

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